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CHAPTER 11 OF NAFTA: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
SOVEREIGNTY?
DonaldS. Macdonald
I. INTRODUCrION

Arguably the most innovative feature of the NAFTA investment provisions, however, is the establishment of dispute settlement processes based on arbitration according to international arbitral rules, in
particular those of ICSID, the International Convention on the Setflement of Investment Disputes. The NAFTA Parties consent to
submission to arbitration of investment disputes under Chapter 11, at
the request of the private investor itself. This makes NAFTA the first
comprehensive international trade treaty to provide to private Parties
direct access to dispute settlement as of right.
In entering into Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the chapter relating to investment, the government of Canada was
confirming its departure from two long-established treaty-making customs.
The two changes of direction were not unprecedented. In both cases, a limited number of precedents in Canadian state practice could be found for each
of these steps. But Chapter 11 of the NAFTA represents a change potentially
of much greater scope than the previous cases, and these two aspects particularly attract my comment in discussing Chapter 11.
What are the two changes? The first is the undertaking to make comprehensive international commitments to protect foreign investment. For reasons
that I shall discuss, the government of Canada in the past has been loath to
enter into either bilateral or multilateral treaties guaranteeing investment. The
second is that Canada has adhered to the more traditional view that nationstates, and, under some circumstances, international organizations, are the
appropriate persons to make claims based on international law in interna* Donald Macdonald is Counsel at the Toronto office of Canada's national law firm,
McCarthy Tdtrault He received his LL.M. from Harvard University, his LL.B. from Osgoode
Hall, and a Diploma of International Law from Cambridge University.
I MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 297 (Rootledge, London & New York, 1995). The authors of this book note that the
Treaty of Rome does recognize such rights, but observe that it is much more than a trade
agreement. It is a treaty leading to much broader co-operation between governments, and the
co-ordination of a wider range of policy.
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tional tribunals, but that nationals, either individual or corporate, are not. By
addressing these two points, I hope to enlighten you on Canadian international practice and domestic law, and also on the politics behind the previous
national policies.
II. INVESTMENT PROTECTION

Over the past thirty years, there has been a clear trend towards protecting
the rights of investors in other states by bilateral international treaties. Some,
but not all of that process, was driven by international organizations such as
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), of
which Canada is a member. Relative to other developed countries, Canada
has been slow to accept the obligations of such treaties. 2
Canadian reluctance was in no sense because of hostility to international
investment. From the very beginnings of European settlement in our part of
North America, Canadian prosperity has been driven by investment from
abroad, both public and private. It is not investment itself which has been the
source of the Canadian reluctance, although there has always been a spirited
national debate as to the potential risk of loss of control that investment
might bring. Rather, it is the structure of the Canadian constitution, specifically the distribution of powers between the national and provincial governments, which has caused the government of Canada to hesitate in making
international commitments to protect foreign investment.
In the words of a leading authority on Canadian constitutional law, "[t]he
provincial Legislatures .. .probably have a general power to expropriate
property in the province, simply by virtue of their legislative power over
'property and civil rights in the province."' 3 The constitutional changes of
1982 put important restraints on the freedom of action of both the federal and
provincial governments in the field of civil rights. But, they did not impose
rights comparable to those of American constitutional law in favour of the
owners of property. The Canadian Charter of Rights, section 7, assures that
"everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person. . . " but it
does not go on, as do the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution with respect
to the powers of Congress or the States, to
4
assure the right to "property.",
2

Canada entered into its first bilateral investment promotion and protection treaty in

1989 with the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See CAN. Y.B. INT'L. L. 1991, 373-

89.

3 Canadian Constitution, § 92(13), quoted in PErMR W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF

CANADA,

396 (Carswell, Toronto, 2d ed. 1995).

4 Constitution Act of 1982, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms §
7. There is a

long history of case law under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

See,

e.g.,
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You may ask, what are the politics behind the non-protection of property
under Canadian constitutional law? For a variety of reasons, political ideology, history, or just plain parochialism, the provincial governments that met
with the federal government to negotiate the 1982 amendments were not able
to agree on the protection of property rights. Nor, judging by a recent press
report, have the provinces changed their views, even though they may have
changed the governing parties and the personalities in charge:
'It's got to be up to the provinces to decide whether or not they're
going to participate in the MAI [Multilateral Agreement on Investment]. And the federal government has to accommodate that situation,' said Noel Schacter, a senior B.C. trade official. 'I
5 think almost
way.'
that
feels
date
to
of
know
we
that
every province
An American listener may comment that, whatever the limitations on the
protection of property within Canada, surely the government of Canada must
be able, under its treaty-making power, to carry out treaty obligations to foreign countries to protect property as the United States could do under Article
II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. The answer is that there was no provision for a domestic treaty ratification process comparable to that of the
United States included in the Canadian constitutional arrangements of 1867,
and governments in Canada have been unable to agree to include one since
then, even though in the interval there has been an important change in Canada's place within the world. The Canadian government has the power to
enter into treaties with foreign states on behalf of Canada as a whole, but the
Canadian Parliament has no power to carry such treaties into effect within
the country where the subject matter of the treaty and the enactment falls
within the jurisdiction of the provincial governments. As the presiding judge
in the leading case on this matter stated in his reasons for judgment:

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Road Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). The predecessor of
the Canadian Charter in the rights field was the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960), 8-9 Eliz. II, c.
44, an enactment of the Parliament of Canada which recognized "the right of the individual to
life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property," but the last words were not
carried forward into the Charter. The Canadian Bill of Rights is binding only on the federal
government, and it survives the enactment of the Charter.
5 GLOBE & MAn (Toronto) Feb. 18, 1998, at
B7.
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While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign
waters she still retains the water-tight compartments
which are an es6
sential part of her original structure ....
In other words, the Dominion [as the national government was then
described] cannot, merely by making promises to foreign countries,
clothe itself with legislative authority inconsistent with the constitution which gave it birth.7
It was because of those constitutional limitations that the government of
Canada was reluctant to enter into international agreements which would
require enforcement within the provincial area of jurisdiction. In stating that,
I speak not just from surmise based on external observation, but from participation in the government process, both as a Minister and in several capacities
with the Department of External Affairs (as it then was).
Why then, it might be asked, did the cautious bureaucrats and Ministers
from two successive Canadian Ministries throw caution to the winds and
commit Canada to NAFTA to the wholehearted protection of foreign investment? Here I do engage in surmise, for I was not privy to those negotiations.
I think that the government of Canada was prepared to take its constitutional
chances because the investment provisions were included within a trade
agreement. To continue the constitutional discussion, section 91(2) of the
Canada Act of 1867 gives to the Parliament of Canada the power to make
laws in relation to "the regulation of trade and commerce.
The scope of
that otherwise extensive phrase has been much cut down by judicial interpretation within Canada, but there has not, so far as I know, ever been an
effective challenge of a trade agreement with a foreign country, an agreement
negotiated and signed by the government of Canada pursuant to its executive
powers and justified on the basis of the trade and commerce power. If challenged, the government of Canada could do no better than to adopt the arguments set out by Daniel Price in an article that he wrote a year ago, when he
put it succinctly as follows: "Trade and investment flows are interdependent.
To achieve the benefits of economic liberalization, investment barriers must
'9
be addressed as comprehensively as trade barriers.
6 Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney-General of Ontario [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.)
[hereinafter Labour Conventions Case].
7 Id.

Canada Act of 1867, § 91(2).

9 Daniel M Price, The Benefits of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, USIA ELECTRONIC J. 1-3, Apr. 1997.
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So is Chapter 11 immune from attack within Canada, or if attacked, can it
successfully be defended? There are a number of provincial governments in
Canada of a social democratic persuasion that do not have the same view of
the market or of private property as the rest of us. There are other governments that may feel that, on a certain issue, picking a fight with the national
government is good local politics. I cannot say that an attack will not be
made against Chapter 11, nor even that a court may not be so unwise as to
declare it to be ultra vires of the government of Canada. So far as the foreign
complainant is concerned, dispute resolution proceedings would stand, and a
successful award under those proceedings would stand. It would merely be
that the government of Canada, rather than a particular provincial government, would have to pay the bill for damages and costs. 10

III. THE CLAIM OF ETHYL CORPORATION
The common law in Canada relating to compensation for expropriation of
property has recently been re-stated and, in relation to the Charter, in a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal." The suit in question was an action for
a declaration that certain landowners were entitled to compensation from the
provincial government as a result of residential rent regulations which
avoided provisions for future rent increases to the landowners (Ontario continues to have in effect a partial rent-control regime). The plaintiffs' claim
was founded upon both the Charter of Rights and common law jurisprudence
concerning the expropriation of property.
Under Canadian common law, there is a recognized rule for the construction of statutes that, unless the words of the statute clearly so demand, a statute is not to be construed so as to take away the property of the subject without compensation. For the rule to apply, there must, in the view of the court,
be a taking or an expropriation of the property; regulation of use of property
without taking would not entitle the claimant to compensation. In holding
that the provincial statute did not constitute expropriation in the case in
question, but regulation, Judge Goudge of the Court of Appeal stated the
principles as follows:
The 1991 Act is not an act of expropriation by the Crown. Rather, it
is an exercise of its regulatory authority. There is no principle of
statutory interpretation that would presume that those adversely affected by a statute regulating their affairs are entitled to compensa10 Since entering into the NAFTA, Canada has entered into a trade agreement with Chile.
Articles G-01 et seq. of that Agreement are substantially in the terms of Chapter 11 of

NAFTA.
11 A & L Investments Limited v. Ontario, [1997] 36 O.R.2d 127.
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tion unless the statute says otherwise. No policy basis is readily apparent for such a rule. Indeed, such a principle would severely hamper the operation of the modem state where most regulatory legislation, however remedial, adversely affects someone. Moreover, if
regulatory legislation voiding, but not expropriating, property rights
triggered a presumed right to compensation from the state, the effect
would be to give property rights the equivalent of the protection accorded by section 7 of the Charter despite the clear exclusion of such
rights from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by its drafters. In
other words, an individual would have the right not to be deprived of
his property by regulatory legislation except with compensation or
with an explicit override of that right by legislative language. This
would seem to do indirectly something the framers of the Charter declined to do. 2
Of considerable interest to the press, and to international lawyers, has
been a claim brought by Ethyl Corporation against the government of Canada
under Chapter 11 of the NAF1A. Ethyl Corporation is the manufacturer
and the exclusive distributor in Canada of MMT, which is a fuel additive
intended to increase the octane level of automotive fuels. It has been alleged
on one side that the additive is a danger to health, an allegation that has been
contested by Ethyl Corporation. Outside commentators have suggested that
the dispute is really about who should pay for automobile pollution controls,
the automakers or the oil companies, 4and in that sense, the government of
Canada has been caught in the middle.1
Whether rightly or wrongly, the government of Canada introduced a bill
into Parliament to enact "the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act," which
would have restricted the right
]5 to import MMT into Canada or distribute it in
inter-provincial commerce. The wholly owned Canadian subsidiary of
Ethyl Corporation imports the chemical, reformulates it, and distributes it
throughout Canada. In face of the proposed enactment, the parent corporation
launched an application under Articles 1116 and 1120 of NAFTA arguing
that, in the proposed legislation, Canada was in default of its obligations un-

12 Id. at 135.
'3 Groups See Dangerfrom Ethyl Suit, 14 INT'LTRADE. REP. 1248
(July 16, 1998).
4 An unhealthy remedy for dealing with the MMT dispute,FIN. PosT, Feb. 6, 1997.
15 Bill C-29, Second Session, 35 Parliament. Royal Assent, Apr. 25, 1997, but not yet
proclaimed.
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der Articles 1102 (National Treatment), 111016(Expropriation and Compensation), and 1106 (Performance Requirements).
Whatever the merits of the technical arguments, I would anticipate that
one of the arguments of the government of Canada would be that the effect
of the statute was not "expropriation," but rather "regulation" for the protection of public health and, therefore, would be beyond the jurisdiction of
Chapter 11. My understanding is that the issue of "expropriation"or "regulation" has been much litigated in the United States under the Bill of Rights,
and I would not presume to state what the law is in the United States. My
understanding is that U.S. law would be somewhat different from the law in
effect in Canada as indicated by the recent decision of the Ontario Court of
Appeal.
Conceivably, the arbitrators in the Ethyl case will have. to wrestle with the
differences in the laws of Canada and the United States on whether a regulatory scheme created by the legislature that adversely affects the property
rights of a claimant would constitute "expropriation" under Article 1110 of
NAFTA. The tribunal's decision could have particular significance in light of
the current debate within Canada about the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).
Debate has been focussed by opponents of the MAI on the proposition
that the treaty would prevent "regulatory legislation" as described in the
judgment of Judge Goudge; 17 for example, that creating publicly supported
health care, or measures taken in support of Canadian media and endeavours
in the arts, two aspects of public policy-making where Canadian aspirations
differ radically from those in the United States. If measures in Canada to give
pre-eminence to public institutions as providers of health care, or to guarantee the continuation of media of communication that assure Canadian content, were to be classified as "expropriation" of foreign interests with consequent costs in damages, then national policies with widespread public support would be in jeopardy. For the moment, governments will not be pursuing the signature and ratification of the MAI,ironically, at the behest of the
United States. The decision in the Ethyl case may have ramifications wider
than the fuel additive business.
16 I am advised by Mr. Barry Appleton of the firm of Appleton & Associates of Toronto,
counsel for the Complainant, that further details of the proceeding are not available during the
continuation of the arbitration pursuant to Rule 15 of THE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE
INSTITUTION OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS (International Centre for the
Settlement of Disputes" Rules entered into force Oct. 14, 1996). "The deliberations of the
Tribunal shall take place in private and shall remain secret." Ethyl Corporation has, however,
made available to the press information on its case. See 13 INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 24,
1995); 14INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Sept. 20, 1996); GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) Oct. 27, 1997.

17 A& L Investments Limited v. Ontario, supra note 10, at 135.
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The second aspect in which Chapter 11 of NAFTA departs from customary Canadian international practice has been the recognition of the rights of
private persons, whether individual or corporate persons, to have status in
international proceedings. In general, the Canadian approach would have
been in accord with the following statement:
Although there is no rule that individuals cannot have procedural capacity before international jurisdictions, the assumption of the classical law that only states have procedural capacity is still dominant and
affects the content of most treaties providing for the settlement of
disputes which raise questions of state responsibility, in spite of the
fact that, frequently, the claims presented are in respect of losses suffered by individuals and private corporations.
Sp'.aking from my own experience, both within and outside government,
officials responsible for claims against foreign governments have found
themselves caught in a dilemma. First, as Canadian nationals go increasingly
out into the world, they are going to get into disputes with foreign governments. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade would
prefer not to have to bear the increased burden of espousing cases on behalf
of nationals. As every legal practitioner knows, not every claimant is noble,
and not every claim is meritorious, and the process of determining which are
and which are not can be expensive, both in time and substance. And, secondly, some claims have a capacity to become national or even international
incidents, and governments cannot afford to be seen to be indifferent to the
interests of the national or nationals in question. Perhaps intervention at an
earlier stage leading to noble failure would save the officials much grief later
on.
Chapter 11 will not totally exempt governments from criticism in the
future about not espousing these kinds of claims against a foreign government. But the kind of disputes involved in Chapter 11 are mainly about
money, rather than the liberty of the subject or other basic human rights. The
procedure will not assist with smaller claims, but claims such as those in the
Ethyl case are better dealt with in this way.

18

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 578 (3d ed. Oxford, 1979).

